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The Church-State Situation in Poland Alter the 
Collapse of Communism 
Krystyna Daniel* 
The changes and developments spawned by the political 
transition period in Poland not only reached governmental 
heights but also extended into the religious realm, particularly 
affecting the Catholic Church. This paper will describe the 
changed situation of the Catholic Church in Poland after the 
June 1989 transitional period and will also explore underlying 
explanations of the changes. 
Without doubt, two things that catch our attention when 
we focus on the Catholic Church in Poland after the communist 
collapse are the significant reinforcement of its legal position 
on one hand and the significant decrease in its prestige in 
Polish society on the other. The reinforced legal position may 
be expected, especially in a country with a notable Catholic 
tradition where the Church experienced significant limitations 
under communism.' However, the loss of prestige is surprising 
and raises many questions. 
In order to gain the perspective necessary to explain the 
position of the Catholic Church in contemporary Poland, I 
would like to begin with some basic information. Poland has 
generally been recognized as a profoundly Catholic country 
with a highly legitimized position of the Church. The idea that 
Poland is a very Catholic country, one deeply rooted in Polish 
culture, is based on two main facts. First, Poland has a long 
historical experience with Catholicism dating back to the Tenth 
Century, when, in 966, the Polish ruler Prince Mieszko I 
* Doctor of Law; Faculty of Law, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland. 
1. Nevertheless, the oppression of the Church in Poland between 1945 and 
1989, however hard, was not nearly as drastic as that in the other communist 
countries: for example, in the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Romania, many church 
buildings were destroyed, closed or turned into museums, storehouses or factories; 
religious worship and entrance to seminaries were limited and controlled by the 
state. See M. BANASZAK, 4 THE HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC HURCH 132-33, 138-48 
(Akademia Teologii Katolickiej, Warszawa 1992). 
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adopted Christianity and Poland formally became a part of 
Christian E ~ r o p e . ~  Second, the Catholic Church is, and always 
has been, the predominant denomination in the country. 
Indeed, at present, 95% of the entire population is Cath~l ic .~  
Poland is currently one of the most monoethnic countries in 
Europe. Poland has also never been so ethnically homogenous. 
According to the most recent data, ethnic minorities, such as 
Germans, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, constitute no more 
than 3 t o  4% of Poland's population.' However, there has 
always been a Polish, as well as a Catholic, majority. For 
example, in 1931, Poles made up only 69.9% of the whole 
population, while 13.9% were Ukrainians, 8.6% were Jews, 
3.2% were Germans, and 3.1% were Byelo~ssians.~ The 
dominant majority of these ethnic minorities in Poland consists 
of non-Catholics. 
Traditionally, it has been counter-intuitive to think about 
Poles who do not belong to the Catholic Church; membership in 
the Church was, and still is, perceived as one of the most 
important features of belonging to the Polish nation. In fact, 
the stereotypical expression "Pole-Catholic" appears to be 
deeply rooted in the national consciousness. A 1994 survey 
shows that for 55% of Poles, membership in the Catholic 
Church is perceived as an important criterion for belonging to 
the Polish na t iod  
Another factor that contributes to the strong position of the 
Catholic Church in Poland is connected with historical events. 
2. The adoption of Christianity by Prince Mieszko I in 966 was preceded by 
his marriage to Catholic Princess Dobrawa from Bohemia in 965. See A. ZAMOYSKI, 
THE POLISH WAY: A THOUSAND-YEAR HISTORY OF POLES AND THEIR CULTURE 10 
(1994). 
3. GE~WNY UR@ STATYSTYCZNY [THE L1TI'I.X YEAR-BOOK OF STATISTICS] 54 
(Warszawa 1992). 
4. In Poland there are 350,000-500,000 Germans, 2,000-250,000 Ukrainians, 
200,000-250,000 ByelorussiadWhite Russians, about 25,000 Romans, 20,000-25,000 
Lithuanians, 25,000 Slovaks, no more than 15,000 Jews, 10,000-12,000 Russians, 
8,000 Ormians, and 30,00040,000 Czechs; altogether 1,200,000-1,700,000 people. 
This data is based on the Report of the Office for Studies and Expert Evidence of 
the Office of the Seym; hdziiiski, The Policy of the Polish State Toward Ethnic 
Minorities in 1989-93 (January 1994) (unpublished report). 
5. B. OLSZEWICZ, THE PICTURE OF CONTEMPORARY POLAND. FACTS, FIGURES 
AND TABLES (Warszawa 1938); J. TOMASZEWSKI, THE ETHNIC MINOR~~IES IN POLAND 
IN XX C E ~ Y  (Warszawa 1993). 
6. The results of these polls have been met with Catholic Church approval 
and with some concern among Protestants. See the comments upon the polls by T. 
Pieronek, Bishop of the Catholic Church, and B. Trand, pastor of the Evangelical- 
Reformed Church, GAZETA WYBORCZA, September 8-9, 1994, at  17. 
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Through the ages, the Church senred not only as a religious 
institution but also as a significant national icon, especially 
when Polish political institutions were weakened. This was 
particularly true when Poland lost its political independence 
during the 123-year period that began with its partition among 
Austria, Prussia, and Russia and ended in 1918, when Poland 
regained its independence following World War I.? The Church 
gained strong legitimization during World War I1 and during 
communism, when the Polish government and other state 
institutions were controlled by the Soviet Union. In turn, 
governmental institutions were held in low esteem by Polish 
so~ie ty .~  
During communism in Poland, the Catholic Church, in 
spite of numerous abridgements, enjoyed some level of 
autonomy, especially in comparison with other countries under 
Soviet d~mination.~ For example, in communist Poland, until 
1961, religious classes were not excluded from public 
 school^.'^ Even more significant is the fact that the Catholic 
Church received financial aid from the communist state when 
the state supported one university-level Catholic school and 
paid salaries for teachers of religious classes (since 1961). 
Additional Christian denominations also received support 
through the Church's Fund." It is clear that communist 
authority could not entirely neglect the profound religious, as 
well as cultural and national, feelings of the Poles. During that 
time, the Church was the only institution that could openly 
criticize the communist government and intercede for the 
7 .  See J. KLOCZOWSKI ET AL., THE OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE 
CATHOLIC HURCH IN POLAND 235-54 (Znak, Krak6w 1986). 
8. Id. at  362-70, 474-508. 
9. Id. at 384. The significant level of the Church's autonomy was connected 
on the one hand with the treaty signed between the Church and the Government 
on April 14, 1950, and on the other hand with the uncompromising attitude of the 
Polish Primate Stefan Wyszyhski, who opposed the increased control over the 
Church imposed by the state in 1953. 
10. The religious classes were expelled from public schools on the basis of the 
Statute on Development of Education and Upbringing of 1961, Dziennik Ustaw 
Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej [Government Regulations and Laws Gazette of 
the Polish People's Republic] [hereinafter DzU PRLI No. 32, item 160, art. 2. Since 
1961, religious teaching has been held in the Church's buildings and other places, 
outside the public schools' premises. 
11. The state paid for the Academy of Catholic Theology and the non-Catholic 
Christian Academy of Theology. See M. PIE-, THE ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 172-73 
(Warszawa, PWN 1993). 
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oppressed. For example, it was the Church that actively and 
successfully opposed nationalization of private farms.12 
As communism weakened, the Church concentrated large 
groups of society around itself-not just practicing Catholics, 
but skeptical intellectuals and non-believers as well. A strong 
and visible collaboration was especially evident during the 
"Solidarity period."13 Particularly, the last decade of the 
communist regime may be viewed as one of religious upheaval 
and increasing cooperation between the Catholic ecclesiastical 
institutions and society. During this period the notion of the 
universal Church, comprised not only of its hierarchy and 
clergy in general but also of the believers at large, became true 
as never before. The Church unified and consolidated the 
society in the struggle against communism, and in 1989, when 
communism collapsed, the Church was the unquestioned moral 
authority in society. Consequently, communist Poland seemed 
to be one of the last European bastions of deep and authentic 
religiosity.14 
The new realities considerably changed the legal position 
of the Catholic Church in Poland. First of all, the post- 
communist government adopted several laws that not only 
strengthened the autonomy of the Church in relation to the 
12. Poland was the only country in the communist block where private 
farming was preserved, although the attempt to socialize private farms was 
undertaken twice: between 1949 and 1956 and again in the seventies. See J. 
KUBIN, THE COMMUNISTS IN THE POLISH COUNTRY 19-26, 48-49 (Wydawnictwo 
MySli Nieinternowanej 1988). 
13. The Independent Autonomous Labor Union "Solidarity" was established 
between July 30 and September 31, 1980, was registered on November 10, 1980, 
was delegalized on December 13, 1981, and was again registered on October 8, 
1982. Solidarity gathered over 10 million members and was more than simply a 
labor union. See A. ZAMOYSKI, THE POLISH WAY: A THOUSAND-YEAR HISTORY OF 
POLES AND THEIR CULTURE 390-96 (1994) (discussing the connections between the 
Church and "Solidarity"); P. NITECKI, THE CHURCH, "SOLIDARITYn AND A SOCIAL 
REVIVAL IN POLAND (OPTIMUS, Warszawa 1991); J. WCZOWSKI, supra note 7, a t  
412-13 (Znak, Krak6w 1886); T. GARTON ASH, THE POLISH REVOLUTION, SOLIDARITY 
1980-1981 108-09 Wydawnictwo Krqg, Warszawa 1987). 
14. See J. Zakowski, The Two Churches or Catho-Right, Catho-Left and Catho- 
Neurosis, GAZETA WYBORCZA, May 16, 1993, a t  10-11. In this article, the author 
shows the relations between the Church, society, and authority under and after 
communism. According to the author, the Church's struggle with communism did 
not reveal its internal divisions, such as the division between integristic and open 
Catholicism on one hand and conservative and liberal Catholicism on the other. I t  
was the collapse of communism that showed that the Church in Poland is quite 
differentiated and quite far from unity. 
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state, but also introduced Christian values into the axiological 
base of the new, democratic system of law. 
A very brief look at  the current law in Poland fkom the 
viewpoint of its reference to the Catholic Church must begin 
with the Polish Constitution.15 The Constitution of 1952, 
which is still in effect, propounds general regulations 
concerning church-state relations and religious freedom. An 
examination of the constitution leads to the conclusion that 
Poland is an ideologically neutral country.16 Article 82 
declares church-state separation while simultaneously granting 
free exercise of religious function." The same article also 
grants freedom of consciousness and creed? Additionally, 
Article 82 states that a church-state relationship can be 
determined only by statutory law.'' Article 81 of the 
constitution assures the equality of conscience and creed.20 
It is also worth mentioning, however, that the Polish 
Constitution dates back to the communist period and therefore 
suffers by its association with communism. However, it is the 
first Polish Constitution to guarantee church-state separation 
as well as equal recognition of all denominations. Interestingly, 
previous Polish Constitutions, those of 1791;' 1921:~ and 
1935,~~ in contrast with the Constitution of 1952, were 
adopted in a democratic way, yet they established a privileged 
position for the Catholic Church through primam inter 
pares.24 
The Constitution of 1952 contains only general provisions 
and, therefore, requires other, more specific, regulations. In the 
15. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland [hereinafter RP Const.], 
adopted in July 22, 1952 as the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic 
[hereinafter PRL Const.], was amended many times: in 1976, 1980, 1982, 1983, 
1987, 1988, 1989 (twice), 1990 (three times), 1991 (twice), and 1992 (twice). 
16. R.P. Const. art. 82, 1 2. 
17. R.P. Const. 
18. R.P. Const. 
19. R.P. Const. 
20. R.P. Const. 
21. Constitution of May 3, 1791, entered to the book of the city of Warsaw 
on May 5, 1791. 
22. Constitution of March 17, 1921, Dziennik Ustaw Republiki Polskiej 
[Government Regulations and Laws Gazette of the Republic of Poland] [hereinafter 
DzU RPI No. 44, item 267. 
23. Constitution of April 23, 1935, DzU RP No. 30, item 223. 
24. Art. 114 and art. 120 of the Constitution of March 17, 1921, introduced 
the obligatory religious classes into the public school system (including religious 
classes for non-believers). 
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absence of such regulation, the constitutional provisions can 
easily be manipulated in the process of interpretation or 
application. Importantly, the same constitution with the same 
provisions concerning church-state relations was in force under 
communism; however, those provisions were somewhat illusory 
because of lack of more specific  regulation^.^' 
Substantial changes arrived in May 1989, less than one 
month before the collapse of communism. The Polish 
Parliament adopted three statutes that gave more specific 
church-state regulations: the Statute on Freedom of 
Consciousness and the Statute on Social Insurance of 
Clergy~nen,~~ and the Statute on the Relationship Between 
the Catholic Church and the State.28 In the following years, 
Parliament also passed individual regulations concerning the 
legal position of other major denominations in Poland.29 
The limited framework of this paper does not allow me to 
present and analyze the entire scope of the legal regulations 
concerning Polish church-state relations generally or the 
position of the Catholic Church specifically. Instead, I will focus 
on the most general, as well as the most controversial, 
regulations. 
Generally, the Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and 
Creed, while possessing the character of a lex generalis, gave 
force to broad constitutional problems regarding religious 
freedom and freedom of conviction. Additionally, it defined the 
basic relationship between church and state. In particular, 
Article 2 of the Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and Creed 
precisely defines the meaning of freedom of consciousness and 
25. See PIETRZAK, supra note 11, a t  164. 
26. Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and Creed of May 17, 1989, DzU 
PRL No. 29, item 155. 
27. Statute on Social Insurance of Clergyman of May 17, 1989, DzU PRL No. 
29, item 156. 
28. Statute on the Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State of 
May 17, 1989, DzU PRL No. 29, item 154. 
29. Individual statutes that regulating relations between the state and 
particular churches have been adopted for the Polish Orthodox Church, Statute on 
the Relationship Between the Polish Orthodox Church and the State of July 4, 
1991, DzU RP No. 66, item 287; for the Evangelical-Augsburg's Church, Statute on 
the Relationship Between the Evangelical-Augsburg's Church and the State of 
March 25, 1994, DzU RP No. 73, item 323; and for the Evangelical-%formed 
Church, Statute on the Relationship Between the Evangelical-Reformed Church and 
the State of March 25, 1994, DzU RP No.73, item 324. Drafts of three other 
statutes have been prepared: for the Methodist Church, the Baptist Church, and 
the Seventh Day Adventist Church. 
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creed. This article states that all citizens can form churches of 
other denominations, participate in religious holidays, preach 
their religion or share their conviction, raise children according 
to their own beliefs, keep silent in matters concerning their 
religion and personal convictions, maintain contacts with co- 
religionists, acquire religious information, produce and 
purchase objects relating to their religious sect, and associate 
in secular organizations to promote religious con~ictions.~~ At 
the same time, another article of the statute states there are to 
be no state endowments or subsidies for churches.31 However, 
there is also a provision that allows financial aid to churches 
according to specific  regulation^.^^ Thus the statutes begin to 
more narrowly define the constitutional clauses relating to 
religion. Finally, Article 11.1 establishes the autonomous 
character of churches and denominations, while in Article 11.3, 
churches and other denominations are granted the right to 
undertake action before the Constitutional T r i b ~ n a l . ~ ~  
As mentioned above, the legal position of the Catholic 
Church, as well as the position of some other major 
denominations in Poland, is ultimately regulated by specific 
statutes that have the character of lex specialis in relation to 
the Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and Creed and to the 
constitutional law.34 Analyzing the ecclesiastical law in 
Poland reveals four levels of legal regulation: (1) the 
constitution; (2) a general statutory regulation that refers to all 
churches and denominations; (3) the individual statutory 
regulation that refers to the particular churches and 
denominations; and (4) other lower ranking regulations such as 
administrative orders, instructions or circular letters. 
The legal position of the Catholic Church is presently 
founded on a statute.35 The statute guarantees the wide 
autonomy and self-government of the Church. For example, the 
statute grants the Church the right to exclusively recall its 
30. Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and Creed of May 17, 1989, DzU 
RP No. 29, item 155. 
31. Id. art. 10, 'g2,cl .  1. 
32. Id. art. 10, 'j[ 2, cl. 2. 
33. Id. art. 11, 'j[ 2. 
34. The law that has the character of lex specialis includes the individual 
statutes adopted for particular churches. See supra note 29. 
35. Statute on the Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State of 
May 17, 1989, DzU PRL No. 29, item 154. See specifically art. 2. 
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fun~tionaries .~~ It also contemplates guarantees for direct as 
well as indirect financial aid:' which include support for 
educational and charitable activities performed by the 
The statute establishes numerous tax and custom 
exceptions such as the income tax, property tax, and 
community tax3' The statute also regulates the wide scope of 
Church property re~titution.~' The state also bears a 
substantial part of insurance of clergy4' The next important 
element to notice is the provision of article 19.2 of the statute 
regulating the relationship between the Church and state 
where expresis verbis allows religious education in public 
schools. This provision was added September 7, 1991:~ 
following the decision passed by the Constitutional Tribunal on 
January 30, 1 9 9 1 , ~ ~  that  confirmed the legality of 
implementing religious education in the public school system. 
In spite of the Constitutional Tribunal decision, the law 
introducing religious classes to public school was in conflict 
with several legal regulations, including the Statute on 
Education and the constitutional principle of church-state 
separation? 
Relevant to the law that regulates public religious 
education are article 12.1 of the Statute on E d u ~ a t i o n ~ ~  and 
36. Id. arts. 13 and 14. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. arts. 21, 22, and 40, P 4. 
39. Id. arts. 55 and 56. 
40. Id. arts. 60-70 with amendments of September 16, 1991, DzU RP No. 
107, item 459. 
41. The Statute on Social Insurance of Clergyman of May 17, 1989 DzU PRL 
No. 29 item 156, arts. 28 and 29. 
42. Statute on the Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State of 
May 17, 1989, DzU PRL No. 29, item 154 (amended September 7, 1991, DzU RP 
No. 95, item 425). 
43. Case No. K.11190 T.C. 
44. The religious classes were introduced into the public school system on the 
basis of the instructions enacted by the Minister of Education on August 3 and 24, 
1990. The Polish Ombudsman brought action against these instructions to the 
Constitutional Tribunal. The Constitutional Tribunal, in a ruling in January 1991, 
upheld the legality of these instructions. However, the tribunal recommended 
changing the Statute on Development of Education and Upbringing of July 15, 
1961, DzU PRL No. 32, item 160, wherein art. 2 was a provision about secular 
education. Consequently, other amendments were introduced to the Statute on 
Freedom of Consciousness and Creed of May 17, 1989, and to the Statute on the 
Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State of May 17, 1989. Both 
amendments were adopted on September 7, 1991, DzU RP No. 95, item 425. 
45. The Statute on Education of September 7, 1991, DzU RP No. 95, item 
425. 
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the administrative order enacted by the Minister of Education 
in April 1 9 9 2 ~ ~  that finally specified the way and the 
conditions of religious teaching in public s~hools.~' Despite the 
obvious constitutional principle of church-state separation, the 
preamble to the Statute on Education of 1991 indicates that 
Christian values should be respected in the process of 
education.48 This is worth mentioning because the contents of 
the preamble are significant for the interpretation of the 
statute. The Statute on Radio and TV Broadcasting, adopted 
January 29, 1992, requires respect of Christian values in public 
broadcasting." Also, a recent law5' introduced severe 
limitations on abortion; although there is no direct reference to 
Christian values in the language of this law, it is a law 
justified by Christian values.51 
There are some significant signs that the strong and 
previously autonomous Church is becoming entangled with the 
46. The Administrative Order of the Minister of Education on the Conditions 
and Way of Organizing Religious Education in Public Schools of April 14, 1992, 
DzU RP No. 36, item 155 (amended August 23, 1993, DzU RP No. 83, item 390). 
47. The Statute on Development of Education and Upbringing of July 15, 
1961, DzU PRL No. 32, item 160, was replaced by the Statute of Education of 
September 7, 1991, DzU RP No. 95, item 425. Also, the instructions of August 3 
and 24, 1990, were replaced by an administrative order of April 14, 1991, which 
specifically regulates religious teaching in public schools. 
On August 19, 1992, the Ombudsman brought an action against this 
administrative order before the Constitutional Tribunal on the basis of infringement 
of the constitutional principle of church-state separation. According to the 
Ombudsman, the order violated the law, including the constitution (arts. 81.1 and 
82.1), the Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and Creed of 1989, and later 
amendments to that statute (arts. 2.5, 20.2, 10.2, and art. 5.2), and the Statute on 
the Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State of 1989, and later 
amendments to that statute (art. 18.3). The Constitutional Tribunal, in its sentence 
No. U.12192, passed on April 20, 1993, generally recognized the legality of the 
order. However, it challenged the provision of article 3.3 that obligates parents who 
do not want religious classes for their children to declare this decision to the 
school authority, and it challenged the provision of article 12 that allows prayer 
and placing of religious symbols in classrooms. 
48. The Statute on Education of September 7, 1991, DzU RP No. 95, item 
425. 
49. The Statute on Radio and TV Broadcasting of January 29, 1992, DzU RP 
No. 7, item 34, arts. 18.2 and 21.2. The Polish Ombudsman brought action against 
these provisions, but the Constitutional Tribunal confirmed the provisions' legality 
in its decision No. AK K.17/93 of June 7, 1994. 
50. The Statute on Family Planning, Human Fetus Protection and Conditions 
for Possibility of Abortion of January 7, 1993, DzU RP No. 17, item 78. 
51. In article 7, the anti-abortion law of January 7, 1993, permits abortion 
only when the life of a woman is in danger or her health is severely threatened, 
when the fetus is severely and irreversibly damaged, or when a pregnancy is 
caused by rape or incest. 
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state. The legal position of the Catholic Church in Poland is 
also regulated by the Concordat that was signed between the 
Holy See and Poland on July 28, 1993.~~ Broadly, a Concordat 
constitutes a bilateral treaty concluded between the Holy See 
and a particular state.53 The bilateral character of this 
regulation usually allows the Church to obtain additional 
prerogatives. In the Polish case, the general objective of the 
Concordat seems to be establishing the entanglement between 
the Church and state as well as strengthening the position of 
the Church by allowing it to influence or even determine the 
content of the new Polish Con~titution.~~ This intention is 
more than clear if we consider the fact that the present 
constitution will likely be superseded; the Constitution of 1952, 
however significantly changed after the collapse of communism 
and supplemented by the so-called Small Constitution of 1992, 
is seen symbolically as a communist one.55 
The current Constitution of 1952 guarantees church-state 
separation, but the new constitutional drafts, submitted to the 
Parliament, are not compatible with each other in the area of 
church-state relations. In several of the drafts the neutral 
position of the state is preserved, but in others the Catholic 
Church holds a privileged position,56 and no clear separation 
between church and state exists. For example, the presidential 
52. Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland, signed on 
July 28, 1993 by Mr. K. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic 
of Ireland and the Reverend J. Kowalczyk, the Apostolic Nuncio, in Warsaw 
[hereinafter Concordat]. The Concordat will become effective after ratification, 
anticipated in the near future. 
53. A concordat is a generous agreement of international law, concluded 
between the Holy See and a particular country. See J. WISLOCKI, THE POLISH 
CONCORDAT OF 1993: YES OR NO? (Kantor Wydawniczy S A W ,  Poznan 1993). 
54. For example, article 12 of the Concordat confirms setting up religious 
teaching in all public schools. An especially inexplicit provision of article 12 
provides that all public schools may "organize according to the will of the 
interested persons the teaching of religion in the framework of the plan of school 
and kindergarten classes." 
55. The so-called Small Constitution was adopted on October 17, 1992, DzU 
RP No. 84, item 426. I t  concerns the relationship between the legislative and 
executive powers and self-government in Poland. It is worth noting that Poland is 
the only post-communist country that did not adopt a new democratic constitution. 
As a recent poll shows, a majority of Poles (74%) recognize the great importance of 
adopting a new constitution. CBOS Survey of 1994, POL=, March 5, 1994, a t  
13. 
56. See THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTS 1989-1991 Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 
Warszawa 1992), and the comparison of the seven constitutional drafts presented 
in GAZETA WYBORCZA, September 22, 1994, at 5. 
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control draft and the draft submitted by the Senate allow the 
Concordat to establish church-state r e g ~ l a t i o n , ~ ~  and other 
drafts do not require ratification of the Concordat treaty with 
the Holy See. However, the draft submitted by the post- 
communist Alliance of the Democratic Left, which has been the 
biggest political group in Parliament since September 1993, 
openly declares the secular character of the state? 
The Concordat of 1993 sends a clear message of the 
growing involvement of state institution in religious action. For 
example, the Concordat not only endorses some state 
obligations derived fkom existing law, but also expands them. 
These include, among others, state aid for religious schools at 
the university level5' and expanding support for maintaining 
buildings belonging to the Chur~h.~'  Article 12.1 of the 
Concordat excludes the right of adult students to decide 
whether to take religious classes, a privilege they presently 
enjoy? Nevertheless, possibly the most startling point of this 
treaty is the proposed relation of the Church to the existing 
legal order. First, no provision exists requiring the Church to 
respect the existing law, specifically the constitutional order.62 
This is of great significance, especially considering the fact that 
the provision of the Statute on the Relationship Between the 
Catholic Church and the State that stated "the Catholic Church 
in the Republic of Poland acts within the framework of the 
Constitutional order"63 was removed by amendment in 
September 1991.~~ 
Second, the Concordat introduces some provisions that are 
entirely inconsistent with existing law, particularly regulations 
57. See the comparison of the seven constitutional drafts presented in GAZETA 
WYBORCZA, September 22, 1994, at  5. 
58. Id. 
59. Concordat art. 14, ¶ 3. The text of the Concordat is published in P. 
KUGLARZ & F. ZOLL, THE CONCORDAT MARRIAGE 73-85 (Staromiejska Oficyna 
Wydawnicza, Krakow 1994). 
60. Concordat art. 22, ¶ 4. 
61. Id. art. 12. 
62. Such obligation was provided in the Concordat concluded between the 
Holy See and Poland in 1925. See WISKOCKI, supra note 53. In article one of the 
Concordat there is only one provision about mutual independence and autonomy of 
the Church and state. 
63. Statute on Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State of 
May 17, 1989, DzU PRL No. 29, item 154, art. 1. 
64. Amendment of September 11, 1991, DzU RP 107, item 459, changed 
article one of this statute to read "The Catholic Church acts in the Republic of 
Poland in Each of its Rites." 
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referring to canon law matrimony," and goes so far as to call 
for essential changes in marital law.66 
In summary, it appears that the law adopted following the 
fall of communism not only significantly strengthens the 
position of the Catholic Church, but it also indicates a gradual 
inclusion of Christian values in the axiological base of the 
changing legal system. 
It may be valuable, at  this point, to emphasize that, with 
regard to the shape of a new constitution, the Church openly 
calls for a constitutional acknowledgment of an ideologically 
neutral state, not a secular one, on the one hand, and for 
acknowledgment of the right of an unborn child to life, based 
on religious grounds, on the other hand. With the Church 
actively voicing its opinion on unborn children, it appears 
unlikely that such a provision will be overlooked. The 
implications and importune of the provision are significant and 
obvious in the future con~titution.~~ 
History is full of the "coup de theater." For everybody who 
follows the changes that have been taking place after the 
collapse of communism, it is clear that the Catholic Church in 
Poland, despite new regulations that strengthen its legal 
position, is undergoing a very difficult period, involving 
numerous serious and unprecedented challenges. 
The significant decline of social confidence towards the 
Church and its hierarchy in the years immediately following 
the collapse of communism cannot escape notice. Evidence of 
the decline is found in the decreasing number of people who 
claimed confidence in the Church; the number dropped quickly 
below fifty percent by the end of November 1992.~~ This 
illustrates a rather dramatic decrease when compared with the 
pre-collapse number of ninety percent who felt confidence in 
the Church?' 
One conclusion that emerges almost immediately from 
examining this data, is that the decreasing prestige of the 
65. Concordat arts. 10 and 11. 
66. See WISLOCKI, supra note 53, at 131-41. According to current Polish law, 
religious marriage does not cause any legal consequences. 
67. See the letter of the Polish Episcopacy on the Constitution, 272 
Conference of Polish Episcopacy, Niepokalanow, September 22, 1994. GAZETA 
WYBORCZA, September 25, 1994, at 9. 
68. OBOP polls conducted between 1989 and 1994, GAZETA W ~ O R C Z A ,  
September 20, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter OBOP polls]. 
69. Id. 
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Church in Polish society is connected directly with legal 
decisions concerning the position of the Church in the state. 
Many of these changes, and even some proposals pre-dating the 
changes, generated a strong social reaction not only in 
deliberations of law professors and politicians but also in public 
opinion." The first serious indication of tension in the 
relationship between the Church and the society began in 1990, 
with the controversial and unexpected decision to bring 
religious education to public schools;?' that was followed by 
the implementation of the provision regarding respect for 
Christian values in radio and television broadcasting in 
1992.~~ These actions were quickly followed by a significant 
limitation on the freedom of abortion in the beginning of 
1993,~~ and finally by the Concordat signed in the middle of 
1993.~" Additionally, another significant fact to be mentioned 
here is related to the involvement of the Church in the 
presidential election a t  the end of 1 9 9 0 , ~ ~  and the 
parliamentary election in September 1991.~~ Tliis significant 
increase in negative attitude towards the Church is obviously 
connected with lack of approbation for active, political 
involvement of clergy. An examination of the national data 
gathered in 1991 reveals that, in spite of an overwhelming 
majority of Catholics, 74% of the entire population did not 
approve of the political activity of the Ch~rch. '~  A high level 
of criticism of the Church's involvement in politics has been 
maintained consistently in the years that followed.78 In July 
70. Id. 
71. Religious education was brought to public schools based on Instructions of 
August 3 and 24, 1990, enacted by the Ministry for Education. 
72. Arts. 18.2 and 21.2 of the Statute on Radio and TV Broadcasting of 
December 29, 1992, DzU RP No. 7, item 34. 
73. Statute on Family Planning, Human Fetus Protection and Conditions for 
Abortion of January 7, 1993, DzU RP No. 17, item 58. 
74. Concordat. 
75. The Church supported L. Walesa in the first turn of the presidential 
election held on November 11, 1990. The Church gave Walesa even stronger 
support in the second turn on December 9, 1990, when S. Tyminski was Walesa's 
opponent. 
76. During the electoral campaign in 1991, Bishop J. Michalik, from 
Gorzowska diocese, openly called upon his believers to vote for Catholics: "the 
Catholic is obliged to vote for Catholic, Christian for Christian, Moslem for 
Moslem, Jew for Jew, Mason for Mason, and Communist for Communist." Z. 
Nosowski, The Church and the Election, GAZETA WYBORCZA, February 22, 1992, a t  
10. 
77. OBOP polls, supra note 68. 
78. For example, in March 1992 more than 80% of Polish society did not 
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of 1994, almost 70% of respondents openly declared that the 
Catholic Church in Poland should not actively influence 
 politic^.'^ Additionally, in the answers given in 1993, there 
was a clear conviction of the importance of maintaining 
separation between the Church and state; the majority of 
respondents declared that the Church should not influence the 
election of persons to public office, and the state should not 
involve itself in the internal affairs of the Church by doing 
such things as influencing the selection of Church  official^.^^ 
This attitude was accompanied by low approval of religious 
classes in the public schools with less than forty percent of the 
respondents approving, without any reservation, the Church's 
teaching in public schools.81 There was also a strong 
conviction that the public schools' curriculum should be 
established without any participation of the Church hierarchy, 
while the teaching of religion should remain exclusively in the 
domain of families and churches.82 In contrast, according to 
the majority of respondents, the Church did not devote enough 
attention to fighting the negative phenomena of social life such 
as alcoholism, drug addiction, and intoleran~e.~~ All this 
indicates that a dominant part of Polish society, in the 
transitional period after communism, appears to uniformly 
support a liberal model of the state with clear church-state 
separation. 
A discussion of additional relevant historical and socio- 
political factors is necessary to establish the perspective needed 
to explain this dramatic shift that occurred in post-communist 
Poland. The first factor I would like to examine, as well as 
challenge, is what I call the myth of Polish religiosity, 
including the strong attachment to the Church that was 
mentioned above. 
Many polls confirm that while Polish churches are still full 
of Sunday churchgoers, especially when compared to other 
Western European countries, the society as a whole is 
becoming more secular. Some of the latest polls reveal that 
approve political involvement of the Church. Sopocka Pracownia Badan 
Spolecznych, GAZETA WYBORCZA, May 10, 1992. 
79. Exactly 69% of the population. OBOP polls, supra note 68. 
80. Id. 
81. CBOS polls conducted in May 1992, GAZETA WYBORCZA, May 27, 1992, 
at 2. 
82. Id. 
83. OBOP polls published in GAZETA WYBORCZA, May 27, 1992, at 2. 
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only 56% of those who consider themselves Catholics regularly 
attend religious s e~ces . "  The same data show that people 
with elementary and secondary education take part in regular 
religious s e ~ c e s  more fkequentlf5 than those with a 
graduate level educa t i~n .~~  The devoutly religious are most 
likely to be elderly, rural, and female.87 The increasing 
number of divorces and abortions performed prior to the 
passage of the 1993 abortion law serves as an illustration of 
diminishing religiosity in Poland; both practices are contrary to 
express Church dogma.88 The new law reduced legal abortions 
significantly and raised varied reactions. According to a very 
recent survey, only 32% of the whole population supports a new 
anti-abortion regulation and 52% call for more liberal 
regulations that allow the performance of abortions on social 
grounds.89 Another national survey revealed that 59% of the 
population believes that the Catholic Church should allow 
people to divorce.g0 
A new attitude toward religion is developing, possibly 
leading to the privatization of religi~n.~' The ideology of the 
individual is increasingly different fkom that of the Church. 
From this perspective, Poland is not so exceptional when 
compared with other European countries.92 The process of 
secularization in Poland has been delayed by certain episodes 
84. OBOP polls, supra note 68. 
85. Id. Sixty-nine percent of people with elementary and secondary education 
regularly attend religious services. 
86. Id. Only 37% of people with university education regularly attend 
religious services. 
87. Id. Seventy-one percent of people over 60 and 64% of women attend 
religious services regularly. 
88. Before 1993, according to the regulation of 1956, abortion in Poland was 
available on demand. According to the Main Statistical Office (GUS), in 1980 there 
were 33,800 divorces; in 1985, 49,100 divorces; and in 1990, 42,500 divorces. 
GAZETA WYBORCZA, ugust 22, 1994, at  4. According to Church doctrine, both 
abortion and divorce are forbidden. 
89. OBOP polls. 
90. DEMOSKOP polls, GAZETA WYBORCZA, ugust 22, 1994, a t  4. 
91. Thomas Luckmann describes privatization of religion as "the most 
revolutionary trait of modern society . . . . Each person selects a world of 
significance fkom a variety of choices. The selection is based on consumer 
preference which is determined by the social biography of the individual and 
similar social biographies will result in similar choices." T. LUCKMANN, THE 
INVISIBLE RELIGION: THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION IN MODERN SOCIETY 97 i 105 
(1967) (quoting M.E. MARTY, RELIGION AND REPUBLIC: THE AMERICAN 
CDRCUMSTANCE (1987)). 
92. See R.P. McBrien, Roman Catholicism: E Pluribus Unum, in SPIRITUALITY 
IN A SECULAR AGE 179 (M. Douglas & S.M. Tipton, eds. 1983). 
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in Polish history, such as the period of struggle with 
communism and the time of partition, when Poland lost its 
independence to orthodox Russia, Protestant Pmssia, and 
Austria. Ironically, however, the historical position of the 
Church as a substitute for the political institution, combined 
with the Church's direction of society in its struggle for 
freedom and democracy, actually contributed indirectly to the 
process of secularization. As the Polish example demonstrates, 
under communism, many of those who regularly joined the 
religious service were paying more attention to what priests 
were saying about the political situation than to the religious 
preaching. And more importantly, the churchgoers heard what 
they wanted to hear. Paradoxically, the Church, highly engaged 
in a secular social, political, and quasi-political action, had 
neglected its moral and spiritual activity, leading to its own 
decline. 
Additionally, the Church's position in Poland was not 
always strong and stable. This was particularly evident during 
times of political transition, including the period of communism 
and the time when Poland lost its independence. Although 
examples demonstrating the high prestige of the Church in 
Polish society are easy to find, there are, nevertheless, periods 
in Polish history when the Church lost its prestige among a 
large part of the society. In the seventeenth century, the Polish 
S e d 3  repeatedly forbade anyone to give a legate for the 
benefit of the Church." When Poland emerged fi-om World 
War I and created its sovereign and democratic political 
institutions, the significant development of anti-clericalism was 
spreading into society.95 
The political climate was not the only factor that 
influenced the increase of se~u la r i sm.~~  Among other factors 
contributing to the rise of secularization were the growth of 
science and technology, the expansion of higher education, the 
93. Seym is the lower house of the Polish Parliament. 
94. J. Tazbir, The Fall of the State and the Glory of the Church, POLITYKA, 
March 19, 1991, at 13. 
95. J. CHALASINSKI, YOUNG GENERATION OF THE PEASANTS (PWN, Warsazwa 
1938). In his empirical study, conducted before World War 11, F. Znaniecki notices 
that a significant part of the citizens of Poznan "do not have any respect for clergy 
as one should expect in such Catholic City as Poznan." F. ZNANIECKI, THE CITY IN 
THE CITIZENS' CONSCIOUSNESS: THE SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON POZNAN CITY 372 
(1931). 
96. See J. Tazbir, supra note 94. 
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growing acceptance of liberal values accompanied by a 
permissive view on morality and sex, and, of course, the 
growing role of the state.g7 
Returning again to the historical background of church- 
state-society relations in Poland, it is easy to discover the more 
general tendency that indicates the dependence of the Church's 
legitimation on the condition of the democratic state. Whenever 
the Polish state went through a serious political crisis, and 
thus was unable to create democratic institutions, the 
significance of the Church rose, and society gathered itself 
around her. The corollary is also true: the growing legitimation 
of the democratic state has caused a decrease in the Church's 
prominence among society. 
The position of the Church in Polish society is attributable 
to its political involvement. There are circumstances where this 
political involvement is acceptable and anticipated and there 
are also circumstances where the Church is expected to 
significantly limit its activity in the political sphere. In Poland, 
a significant part of society believes that the success of 
democracy has created a strong need for church-state 
separation and the depolitization of the Church's activity. Why? 
To answer this question it is necessary to focus on two views of 
the government and law: one attributable to the Catholic 
Church, and the other characteristic of modem, liberal, and 
pluralist democracy. Even a superficial look at both views 
reveals the essential, although difficult to surmise, discrepancy. 
The democratic concept of government and law is based on a 
value of freedom. This value implicates rejection of any 
totalitarian or paternalistic regime. In democracy there is only 
one subject pf political power: a society, or more precisely a 
majority of society. Society alone decides, according to 
democratic procedural rules, its political institutions and the 
content of its legal norms. In such a system, law and political 
institutions have derived "from the bottom, according to the 
will of those who are subjected to the state a~thority."~' 
Conversely, for the Catholic Church, legitimation of the 
government and law depends upon clearly defined transcendent 
values as well as subordination to them. According to the 
Church, these kinds of essential values and moral standards 
97. R. WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION 153-63 (1989). 
98. E.W. Bockenforde, The Ethos of Modern Democracy and the Church, in 
FREEDOM, STATE, CHURCH 26 (E. W. Bockenforde, ed., Znak, Krakow 1994). 
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are universally valid and, therefore, cannot be subjected to the 
democratic rules of negotiation and adjustment. The Catholic 
position holds that these essential values and moral standards 
must be adopted irrespective and independent of the opinion of 
the majority. This, however, is irreconcilable with the basic 
value of freedom and cannot be accepted by a society that 
defines itself as a pluralist democracy. 
The strong tension between the Church and society 
resulting from the decision to teach religious classes in public 
schools came not from the introduction of public religious 
education itself but fiom the manner in which this decision was 
made. It was a very low ranking law, enacted by the Ministry 
of Education under the pressure of the Church." Additionally, 
this law was in discrepancy with many other legal regulations, 
including constitutional ones;''' despite amendments, there 
are still some doubts concerning the constitutional provision on 
church-state separation. Such a practice raises serious 
reservations in a society building a democratic state in which 
the legislature is expected to create law freely but in 
accordance with the constitution. 
Generally, there are at least two main ways in which 
church-state relations can be shaped. Broadly speaking, in the 
first case both institutions may preserve separation and full 
autonomy simultaneously. In such a system the state 
maintains religious and ideological neutrality, guaranteeing all 
citizens equal position independent of their religious 
convictions, and a church, in its activities for its believers, 
cannot make use of any state institutions. In the second case, 
there is not such a strict division between church and state, 
and a church may exert a direct influence on citizens through 
state structure. The second case raises a number of 
reservations and controversies, mostly because non-believers, or 
more often non-followers of the "privileged" church, will find it 
difficult to recognize such a state as a c~mmonwealth.'~' 
When analyzing the standard of the Polish law that was 
passed after June 4, 1989, we come to the conclusion that the 
method of regulating church-state relations in Poland has not 
99. This decision was made by the Joint Commission, consisting of 
representatives of the government and the Polish Episcopacy. 
100. See PIETRW(, supra note 11, at 259. 
101. See id., at 48-103; LOREN P. BETH, THE AMERICAN THEORY---CHURCH AND 
STATE 145 (1959). 
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yet been decided. However, a number of normative regulations 
indicate a considerable departure from the separationist model 
adopted in the United States and indicate an approach to a 
model where there is a positive identification between church 
and state.lo2 The inclusion of Christian values into the 
axiological base of the legal system that was introduced under 
the influence of the Church is cause for concern. 
Undoubtedly, the prompt resort to Christian values, in a 
legal system that has experienced forty-five years of 
domination by communist law characterized not by ideological 
neutrality but rather by the intention to limit religion and 
church autonomy, was eagerly welcomed by the Church and 
certain groups of the society. Nevertheless, a t  the same time, 
as shown by the results of surveys presented above, political 
involvement of the Church and the tendency to implement 
religious values into law are viewed by a large part of society 
as a serious threat to a modem, pluralist democracy. As a 
result of its political involvement, the Church is significantly 
and rapidly losing its previously high prestige. This situation, 
however, is not different from the general tendency found in 
the history of Polish church-state relations. Briefly speaking, 
the greatest opportunities were presented to the Church 
whenever the state was in difficulty and could not create its 
democratic institutions, but when the condition of the 
democratic and pluralist state strengthened, the Church lost its 
prominence. 
Considering the present and the full political sovereignty of 
the Third Republic of Poland, we should hope that society will 
support a separation of church and state and that both society 
and the Church will understand what Tocqueville understood 
so well when he wrote that religion is strengthened, not 
weakened, by the separation of church and state.lo3 
102. On the subject of church-state relations models, see among others 
PIETRZAK, supra note 11; and W. Cole Durham, A Comparative Framework for 
Analyzing Religious Liberty, .in FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS AND 
CONSTITUTION-WFUTING  POLAND (Leszek Lech Garlicki, ed., American Studies 
Center, University of Warsaw, 1994). 
103. A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1945). 
